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ABSTRACT
Maritime piracy, a phenomenon which has plagued free maritime trade for thousands of
years, has entered a new age of sophistication and global reverberation. These acts of illegal
criminal activity in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries yield a significant profit
margin for the perpetrators while creating considerable cost for ransom payments, security
measures, capital, and human life. The classification of maritime pirates, as either criminals
hoping to gain financial income or terrorists hoping to usher in political change, is warranted and
compelling. If maritime pirates conduct their operations to institute political change, it is possible
that flags of the United States and its allies can be more susceptible to pirate attacks than others.
The author argues that although the definitional separation of “maritime piracy” and “terrorism”
is becoming increasingly blurred in the twenty-first century, pirates will attack ships based on
convenience and opportunity rather than based on the flags of vessels. Testing of this theory will
be based on quantitative data produced by the International Maritime Bureau to test pirates’
ideologies as a variable. To test if deprivation is a variable to consider, the author will also
compare Indonesian economic performance with the frequency of attempted pirate attacks off its
waters.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Omballi is a young Somali man in his mid-twenties who was interviewed by journalist
Jay Bahadur in the Summer of 2009. Omballi was once a seemingly anonymous truck driver
from a poor inland village, but his fame increased by participating in several maritime hijacking
operations. “We got $1.8 million for the Japanese tanker,” Omballi said of a ship hijacking.
Another ship he helped successfully take was released at a ransom of $1.6 million. For his
participation in these two hijackings, Omballi claimed to have received $50,000 – a portion of
which went to construct a home for his family. When asked by Bahadur what he would have
done if he had not received any ransom money, Omballi leaned back and calmly replied, “Then
we would have killed them [the hostages]”.1
The problem of worldwide maritime piracy is present, and the statistics themselves are
staggering. In the first half of 2009, shortly before Jay Bahadur’s piracy research trip to Somalia,
240 worldwide piracy incidents were reported. Of those incidents, seventy eight were boarded by
intruders, seventy five were fired upon, and thirty one were successfully hijacked. It was further
reported that out of those 240 piracy incidents, 561 crew members on those ships became
hostages, nineteen were injured, seven were kidnapped, six were killed, and eight were declared
missing.2
Despite the staggering figures reflecting the human toll of maritime piracy, the overall
probability of a ship being attacked by pirates is extremely low. For example, a Japanese
Maritime Research Institute study suggested that 75,510 ships over 1,000 gross tons traversed
1
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the Straits of Malacca in 1999, or about 200 transits each day. Because 151 attacks were
executed by pirates in this geographic area in 1999, the probability of being attacked by pirates
was less than two tenths of one percent.3
Conventional wisdom and the popular narrative of maritime piracy is that economic
deprivation is a theory to explain why some pirates begin careers in this criminal enterprise. The
Somali economy, for example, has been especially hurt by illegal fishing, toxic waste dumped
off the coast, civil conflict, and political instability. Thus, the widespread belief is that that many
turn to piracy as a means to achieve economic survival and eventual prosperity.
Pirates know that shipping companies and yacht owners, for example, have seemingly
vast sums of wealth, and are thus not hesitant to demand high ransoms. For instance, Somali
captors demanded a $7 million ransom for one couple hijacked on a 38 foot yacht in 2009.4
According to James Kraska and Brian Wilson, one successful attack can yield $10,000 per pirate
in Somalia, a state whose average annual income is a mere $650.5
It is widely known that foreign jihadists come to Somalia in droves from across the
world, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Britain, and the United States to join al-Shabbab, the
military wing of an Islamist political movement known as the Islamic Courts Union, or ICU.6 As
of January 27, 2012, al-Shabbab is listed by the U.S. State Department as a foreign terrorist
organization. This classification was warranted due to the U.S. State Department’s belief that
their activities threaten U.S. nationals’ safety or the national security of the United States.
3
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Given the Western world’s seemingly incessant dialogue about terrorism since the
September 11 attacks, it is not so farfetched to ponder the true magnitude of terrorism’s global
reach. Although there is a lack of solid uncontestable proof of linkage between Mexican drug
cartels and foreign terrorist organizations, there is a resounding fear that terrorists and weapons
trafficking can occur literally on America’s geographical doorstep.7 However, a 2011 paper
submitted to the Naval War College suggests that such a partnership between both entities is
unlikely, despite several tactical similarities. Insufficient proof and ideological and strategic
incompatibilities render cooperation between drug cartels and al-Qaeda to be unlikely.8
Due to inherent similarities to the concept of an Islamist-cartel alliance, one cannot help
but speculate if piracy and terrorism are financially linked. If a captured ship has the potential to
raise over $1 million in revenue, one must question where those profits go. Do these ransom
monies go toward financing terrorist activities? Is al-Shabbab preparing to wage maritime
terrorism with the use of pirates? Is there an Islamist-piracy conspiracy against Western nations?
Are major shipping corporations indirectly financing terrorism?
If these questions hold true, ransoms may no longer be paid for the safe return of ships
and their crews. This is due to many Western nations’ laws prohibiting financial transactions
from persons and corporations to terrorist organizations. Also, it is probable that any connection
to terrorist organizations may serve as a pretext for military strikes, which does not serve in the
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best interests of the pirates. As put by one Somali analyst, according to Jay Bahadur, “It’s simply
a very, very bad business decision.”9
Research Question
Therefore, the author submits the following research question: What motivates pirates to
attack vessels? There are multiple independent variables to consider for this question such as a
nexus with terrorism, economic deprivation, and convenient proximity to condensed and slow
moving vessels. The primary objective of this question is to ascertain if (and to what degree)
pirates are targeting interests of the United States.
Indeed, the author acknowledges that the definitional separation of the “maritime piracy”
and “terrorism” concepts is becoming increasingly blurred. This assessment is given by
qualitative data produced through interviews of pirates as well as their actions. However, the
discovery of a “smoking gun” proving financial links between maritime pirates and U.S. State
Department defined Foreign Terrorist Organizations is unknown at this time. Not only are
ransom dollars paid by shipping corporations kept private, but “hawala,” an informal and
undocumented Arabic money transfer system, makes the tracking of these dollars nearly
impossible.
How else can one test if there is a tie between maritime pirates and terrorists? The author
believes that if maritime pirates are fundraising for terrorists, then it would be likely that ships
bearing flags of Western nations and U.S. allies are more susceptible to attack than ships with
flags of non-U.S. allies. The author will demonstrate that with the help of this quantitative data,
the ties between Islamists and maritime pirates can be better understood.

9
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Ideology may prove to be a better explanation of a link between maritime pirates and
foreign terrorist organizations. Vessels that are more susceptible to attack may not necessarily be
flagged by Western or American and its allies. Some may argue that “low hanging fruit,” vessels
with slow speeds, minimal protection and inadequate crew training, provides cash flow to piracy
more easily than vessels that are more protected, likely American and its allies’ flagged ships. To
test this argument, qualitative data will test if maritime piracy ideology is comparable to
ideology of foreign terrorist organizations. Qualitative findings from experts and interviews of
the pirates will support the quantitative data, concluding that maritime pirates and foreign
terrorist organizations are separate entities and do not form a joint anti-western conspiracy.
Chapter Summaries
The second chapter will serve as a literature review of the topic. Important books and
articles will be acknowledged, as will their contributions to the global understanding of the
maritime piracy phenomenon. Furthermore, the works listed will be critiqued, and shortcomings
which warrant further research will be suggested by the author. These shortcomings will address
the need for this particular investigation of the ties between maritime pirates and foreign terrorist
organizations. Upon providing the unlikely nature of the relationship between maritime piracy
and terrorism, the second chapter will examine this phenomenon through the various lenses of
international relations theory. Not only can some perspectives of International Relations (IR)
theory offer explanations of the piracy/terrorism phenomena, but it can also help predict some
possible courses of action that could be taken by international actors to rectify this problem on
the high seas.

5

Chapter three will pertain to the methodology of this work. The need for this study, its
parameters, and scope will be identified. Strengths and limitations of the quantitative and
qualitative methods of this study will be reviewed and analyzed. The chapter will explore
definitions to ensure clear and consistent understanding of the actors involved. Like the term
“terrorist,” the concept and meaning of “pirate” is debated heavily. Perhaps the one agreement
that can be reached by governmental and private organizations is that there is no agreement on a
universal and comprehensive definition. Chapter three will describe similarities and differences
between legal and operational definitions of “pirates” and “terrorists.” Sources used to provide
opinion will include experts in international law, intergovernmental organizations, and from
academia.
The fourth chapter presents the research that answers the posed question by first
examining quantitative data by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which publishes annual
reports of pirate attacks voluntarily reported by ships’ crews. These reports provide statistical
information about attack location, vessel type, number of casualties/injuries, vessels’ flags, and
more. Based on the study of this information, it will be inferred that maritime pirates are not
substantially linked to foreign terrorist organizations. Additionally, the fourth chapter will
investigate the relationship between piracy and economic performance of the country in which
piracy is a problem. This study is intended to prove or disprove the narrative that pirates engage
in their activities as simply a career choice with no political motivations whatsoever. If a
country’s economy gets better and more efficient, it could be thought that the level of piracy
attacks should decrease if the deprivation narrative is correct, because more legitimate or legal
means of earning a wage may become available. Chapter four will also provide qualitative

6

information which further supports the inferences drawn by the second chapter. This information
is obtained by interviews of pirates and analysts, and breaks down the economics of maritime
piracy. Although each ship capture can yield millions of dollars for Somali pirates, it is split
amongst the many participants of the hijacking. The business model of maritime piracy will be
examined, which will prove that no margin to support terrorism is rendered.
This study will conclude with the fifth chapter. Findings will be summarized, and study
strengths and weaknesses will be identified in the hope that this work will further the
understanding of maritime piracy. Supported by the data provided in the previous chapters,
policy recommendations will be submitted by the author to interested parties for consideration.

7

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Most researchers of maritime piracy hold that maritime piracy and terrorism are two
separate issues that have distinct ideologies, causes, and responses. One such researcher is Eric
Frécon, whose expertise is in the maritime piracy phenomenon in Southeast Asia, in particular
the Straits of Malacca and Indonesia. Frécon personally observed the difficulties of raising a
family in a coastal village of Southeast Asia as a fisherman. High maritime traffic through the
Straits of Malacca, coupled with pollution and over-fishing, makes the profession extremely
difficult. He concluded, after interviewing young adults that participated in ship hijackings, that
class envy is one of the prime motivators for their actions. Pirates are the maritime equivalent to
pickpockets on land in the Indonesian context, with fast cash and a profitable career being the
ultimate end they desire.10
Although it is possible that the successes of pirates can inspire terrorists to mimic their
acts, Frécon dismisses any possibility of substantive links between maritime pirates and
terrorists. Aside from their differing ends, terrorists would likely cause a significant increase in
government response, which would make the business of pirating much more difficult.
Frécon also remarked that the pirates infringe on too many Islamic laws, such as drinking
alcohol during Ramadan, to be considered ideological partners to Islamist organizations. As
Frécon so eloquently put it, “Lastly, pirates prefer to meet prostitutes near Belakang Padang
rather than the virgins in the ‘Jihadist Paradise’ [of heaven].”11 The difference in motivation
between pirates and terrorists make them unlikely partners.

10
11

Frécon 2006, p. 32-33.
Frécon 2006, p. 34

8

A speech given by Eric Frécon in 2006 was detailed and offered key insight to the piracy
phenomenon in Southeast Asia. He did not offer any parallels between Somali and Indonesian
piracy, but many of the reasons why Indonesian pirates cannot be linked to terrorists may be
applied in Somalia. Unlike other outlooks on piracy, the speaker does not display alarmism about
the increased piracy incidents.12 Similar to other petty crimes that mankind has experienced since
its beginning, steps can be taken to ease piracy, but it cannot be completely eradicated.
Eric Frécon’s research conducted as a young journalist amongst the pirates in Indonesian
ghettos may have served as inspiration for Jay Bahadur, whose work several years later mirrors
that of his predecessor, but in another maritime piracy hotspot half a world away. In 2009, Jay
Bahadur visited Somalia to learn journalism – a method he felt would be far more productive
than obtaining a degree from a mainstream journalism school.13 The product of his 2009 visit to
Somalia is this book “The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World”, in which he
comprehensively documents pirates’ lives by portraying them as human beings rather than using
western stereotypes. To do so required interviews with government officials, jailors, scholars, the
pirates themselves, and many other groups able to provide helpful insight.
Not unlike Eric Frécon’s research, Jay Bahadur’s work is a prime example of immersion
at its finest. It is likely that Robert H. Bates would appreciate Bahadur’s research, for he believes
that it is important for social scientists to put “boots on the ground” or find out first hand “where
people are coming from” to decode verbal expressions and gestures.14 Bahadur embraced this
principle by immersing himself in the environment of maritime piracy, his field of study at the

12
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time. By doing so, Bahadur becomes one of the first civilians to provide a comprehensive
glimpse of time and space – a Polaroid snapshot of the infamous Horn of Africa.
Bahadur reports the phenomenon “as it is,” but does not offer theory to explain “why it
is.” Perhaps this is Bahadur’s training as a journalist (reporting to let the viewer/reader decide),
or perhaps unfamiliarity with the topic. Nevertheless, it leaves the reader thirsty for his overall
assessment about why pirates engage in their hostilities. Despite the lack of personal analysis,
Bahadur does assert that the claim of a joint pirate-Islamist agenda is a mere myth.
Jack Lang, a Special Advisor on legal issues of piracy off the coast of Somalia for the
United Nations,15 submitted to the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council in 2011 Report
S/2011/30. Lang’s claims in the report were based on extensive interviews conducted with key
Somali governmental personnel and imprisoned pirates, both suspected and convicted.16
Lang has repeatedly used the term “criminals” to describe and categorize the pirates off
the coast of Somalia. Lang described the conventional narrative that the same inability of
Somalia to defend its waters from illegal fishing from foreign vessels led to the pirate resurgence
after 2005. However, the actual nexus between piracy and illegal fishing remains yet to be
proven.17 Nevertheless, the country is becoming increasingly dependent on the piracy industry.
Regarding the relationship between foreign terrorist organizations and pirates, Lang only
offered a paragraph. Piracy is seen as contrary to the fundamentalist beliefs of Islamist
insurgents, and can be punished under sharia law. Nevertheless, the location of pirates in al-

15
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Shabbab controlled coastal areas suggests that a portion of ransom dollars, which could reach 30
percent, is paid to al-Shabbab in exchange for the right to co-exist.18
The bold claim that al-Shabbab could be receiving 30 percent of pirate ransom dollars
was entirely unfounded. Even the author admitted that this information needed to be confirmed,
and affirmed that this information was given in several discussions with unnamed individuals.19
Lang provided only circumstantial evidence of the relationship between al-Shabbab and Somali
pirates without specifying the sources.
It seems that most experts in the field of maritime piracy subscribe to the theory that
terrorism and maritime piracy are two separate issues. Nevertheless, there are some such as
Douglas R. Burgess Jr. that believe the contrary, that piracy is terrorism and must be dealt with
as such. Burgess is the author of the book “The Pirates’ Pact: The Secret Alliances Between
History’s Most Notorious Buccaneers and Colonial America”. Burgess’ conclusion that terrorism
and piracy are similar is neither drawn from the modern piracy experience, nor the classical lore
of Blackbeard and privateers of the eighteenth century. According to his op-ed published in 2008
in the New York Times, Douglas R. Burgess Jr. cited the ancient Roman politician Cicero with
his belief that piracy was a crime against civilization. The “pirates are enemies of the human
race” mentality inferred that all states shared a common responsibility of capturing and trying
pirates for the preservation of commerce, and consequently civilization.20
Where Burgess differs from many colleagues is that maritime pirates and terrorists are
alike not because of ideology, but rather because of inadequate definitions that accurately define

18
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pirates. In fact, the author pointed out several similarities between pirates and terrorists: both are
not ordinary criminals or enemy combatants; both are extra-national; both target civilians with
death and destruction. Burgess also advised that both pirates and terrorists commit these acts on
the high seas for private ends, but failed to provide further details to substantiate this claim.21
Burgess’ listed similarities between pirates and terrorists may seem tenuous at best.
Nevertheless, the similarities described in his New York Times article “Piracy is Terrorism”
substantiate his thesis that pirates deserve not only to be dealt with as terrorists, but that the
modern phenomenon of piracy can be justly renamed “maritime terrorism.”
Burgess takes a realist perspective on maritime piracy with the belief that the state is the
central unit of international relations. The overall anarchical nature of international relations has
helped with the lack of a uniform response to terrorism and maritime piracy. Perhaps the most
classic of the international relations theories is realism, for its concept dates back almost 2500
years. The main thinkers of the realism school such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau
believed that order and justice were primary concerns when studying the relationship domestic
and international politics.22 To realists, a central authority creates and maintains order by
protecting citizens from civil unrest, law enforcement, and border protection.23 The absence of an
effective government, such as a failed and/or anarchical state, would likely render the populace
subject to lawlessness, chaos, survival based upon individual capabilities.
A realist would likely assert that maritime piracy results from a government’s inability to
provide the social and legal control to prevent or quell it. According to Foreign Policy magazine,
21
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Somalia topped the 2012 Failed States Index due to concerns with piracy, terrorism, crime, and
ineffective governance resulting in lawlessness.24 Although the view by Foreign Policy is largely
critical of the government establishment of Somalia, it does acknowledge that violence in its
capital Mogadishu has diminished after prolonged urban violence between al-Shabbab and
government forces.
The President of Puntland State of Somalia, Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud Farole,
seems to also have a realist perspective over the state of affairs of his country. The president in
2012 acknowledged Somalia’s ranking on the 2012 Failed States Index, largely based on an
ineffective government of a country “infested with extremists and pirates.” “The view is not
entirely wrong,” he also advised.25 President Farole vigorously defended his regime by
highlighting accomplishments such as free elections and hosting two National Constitution
conferences.
The importance of a national constitution is paramount if a federal and stable Somalia is
to be formed. It is thought by President Farole that government would be further legitimized,
ushering in an era of stability and law enforcement, once such a document is produced – for it
will clearly define the roles and responsibilities of government resources.26 Furthermore,
substantial Somali progress toward a legitimate and functional government can encourage
funding from the international community – precisely what the president challenges other nations
to provide.

24
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The United Nations has called upon Somalia to further enhance its law enforcement
capabilities to combat piracy and terrorism, a task that has been slowly progressing, according to
President Farole.27 With increased assistance from geographic neighbors and parties affected by
the proliferation of maritime piracy based in Somalia, the success of the fight against maritime
piracy in Southeast Asia can be replicated, provided that law enforcement efforts from Somalia
and its neighbors can effectively combat piracy. A full description of this success in the
reduction of maritime piracy in Indonesia is in the fifth chapter. A realist would believe that the
success of Indonesia’s ability to reduce piracy in its waters is a result of the government’s
increasing law enforcement capabilities.
Aside from assistance in law enforcement and counterterrorism operations, President
Farole also asks the international community provide economic development assistance to
Somalia,28 presumably to provide other methods to attain other practical means of making a
living – legally. Data provided in the fifth chapter suggests that a betterment of a state’s
economic conditions may reduce the popularity and appeal of engaging in maritime piracy.
One who subscribes to the Postcolonialism School of international relations theory would
likely examine this suggestion further, for one would likely believe that the lack of economic
vitality in the country was a direct result of European imperialism and exploitation.

The

Postcolonialism School challenges European conventional representations of human nature,
power, and interest which correspond to the experiences of the very societies that Europeans
conquered. Furthermore, Postcolonialists seek to highlight Orientalist histories, or narratives
27
28
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based on stereotypes of a people that helped shape European policies toward their colonies. The
effects of Oriental history, assert Postcolonialists, still reverberate today. 29 Furthermore, those
who subscribe to this particular theory believe that European colonial powers failed to integrate
their territories into “decision-making processes on the international system” and “democratic
structures of governance within the state,”30 according to Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, a professor
of international relations theory.31
Paolo Tripodi is a Lecturer of international relations whose work “The Colonial Legacy
in Somalia” fills a substantial void of research in Italian military and colonial history. Colonial
history remained largely neglected by Italian historical scholars, a fact that validates arguments
presented by subscribers to the Postcolonialism school of international relations theory.
As described by Tripodi, the Italian government had a fifty year presence in Somalia as a
colonizer. Upon independence, Somalia was indeed one of the few African states to have a
democratic system, despite being ill equipped to handle the needs of the Somali people due to its
Italian style bureaucracy. The transitional period took ten years to complete, an insufficient
length of time to develop a self-sufficient economy and a class of bureaucrats and administrators.
From an outside perspective, it would appear that the Italian government felt it was promoting
Somali independence by encouraging a prompt withdrawal of its influence. However, Somalia’s
foundation was still too weak.32 Although this perspective seems positive, in actuality Italy did
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not deem Somali infrastructure a worthy investment due to concerns for its future. 33 Ironically, it
is this very concern, leading to the lack of infrastructure provided to Somalia after independence
in 1960, that may be the root of the piracy and lack of economic development today.
The 2009 journal article “Somali Piracy: The Next Generation” by terrorism lecturer Dr.
Peter Lehr holds opinion which is somewhat contrary to that of Burgess. Terrorists have been
dealt with militarily, but Dr. Lehr’s position warns that a military strike against pirates to prevent
them from waging future attacks will only catalyze conflict in the area by driving them into the
arms of land based groups such as al-Shabbab. Although the connection between piracy and
foreign terrorist organizations was circumstantial at the time of writing, acknowledged Lehr, it
can be made worse by foreign military intervention.
Lehr seems less concerned about a current nexus between maritime piracy and foreign
terrorist organizations, but rather, about the pirates’ evolving demands for ransom from money
only to political demands. The article suggests that there is now a second wave of piracy: the first
with pirates’ ransoms demanding money only, and the second with pirates’ demands of prisoner
release. Lehr also describes this second wave as being more deadly and violent than the first, a
reaction to increased international media publicity and increased resistance faced onboard
commercial vessels.
Lehr was correct to point out that pirates are financially motivated, particularly regarding
his “first wave of piracy” theory. He also successfully demonstrated, through examples of actual
incidents that pirates are beginning to make political demands, such as prisoner releases and
retaliation for facing resistance. This journal article did not address the question, “Does the
33
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second wave of piracy’s politicization mean that there is a definitional change to piracy itself?”
The definitions of “piracy” and “terrorism” were not broken down and individually analyzed to
determine where the second wave of piracy fits categorically despite their evolving ends. This
evident shortcoming leaves the reader to ponder what or where is the threshold that separates
terrorism and maritime piracy, assuming that there remains no hard evidence of al-Shabbab or alQaeda directly benefitting financially from pirate operations.
Emmanuel Nibishaka provided a wealth of information on Somali pirates’ motives and
effects on global trade in “Understanding and Fighting Piracy in Africa.” Furthermore, Nibishaka
articulated international response before spending considerable effort to detail the lack of South
African initiative to participate in military operations to thwart piracy. It is particularly
interesting to read about dual perspectives regarding a military response in Somalia from the
South African point of view. This article is in agreement with Jack Lang’s assessment of the
motive for Somali maritime piracy by citing illegal fishing and toxic waste which contribute to
the country’s debilitated economy. Consequently, the allure of ransom is appealing to a populace
with no hope to achieve economic success through other means. Nibishaka provides evidence
that supports the narrative of economic hardship brought by illegal fishing, but just as quickly as
it is introduced, the argument is refuted by evidence that tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean fell
significantly due to the threat pirates posed.34
Nibishaka does not present any mention of the possible or feared ties between maritime
pirates and designated foreign terrorist organizations. However, his work provides more

34
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evidence that pirates are criminals seeking economic opportunity in an area that is plagued by
little to no hope for sustained success for its populace.
Haywood and Spivak’s “Maritime Piracy” successfully examines the maritime piracy
problem through militaristic, legal, and humanitarian lenses. This comprehensive book provides
a detailed history of maritime piracy, current debates, and emerging trends of the phenomena.
“Maritime Piracy” provides an excellent introduction of the concept to interested audiences,
particularly students and scholars of international law, organizations, and security.
Haywood and Spivak provide little information about the environments that pirates live
in, other than that they must be based in weak states in order for piracy to persist. There has been
a long, historical norm of states prohibiting pirates from securing boats and weapons to
successfully wage piracy, and in the event of failure, a coast guard can be relied upon to issue a
response. If a state is too weak to hold up this two-tiered defense, piracy will persist.35
This perspective holds true, as the two main hotspots of piracy, Somalia and Indonesia,
indeed fit the criteria listed above. However, it can be inferred from this book that piracy is
committed not because of the pirates’ ends, but rather, because there is no legitimate state
enforcement to stop the action. Consequently, the book suggests a holistic and international
approach to ending maritime piracy. Even though piracy is a criminal issue, which the book
asserts, only militaries have the capability to address the problem. This again takes a realist
approach to combating maritime piracy.
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“Strategy is ultimately about how to win wars,” wrote Thomas G. Mahnken,36 editor of
The Journal of Strategic Studies.37 Equally, it is vital to understand what war is – the use of force
to achieve a political purpose, or rather, to force an enemy to do your will. 38 Recall the definition
of terrorism in the second chapter, which also incorporates the use of force to achieve a political
goal. Thus, it can easily be believed that to engage in terrorism is to also engage in warfare.
It is easy to picture warfare in a conventional context; lines of soldiers across a battlefield
aiming muskets at each other, a submarine firing a torpedo at an enemy vessel, or the use of an
intercontinental ballistic missile. However, do all acts of terrorism constitute warfare? For
example, does the attack by Timothy McVeigh, arguably an act of terrorism, also qualify as an
act of war? Consequently, does the act of maritime piracy constitute as an act of war? In the
modern context, the answer would be no. Maritime piracy is committed not to create political
change, but rather, for personal profit. One may assert on the other hand that challenging
international law and norms can also be a political, anti-Western act. Many maritime pirates cite
pollution and illegal overfishing as reasons for committing their acts on the high seas, both
challenges that are political in nature. However, the end result from their act is not to restore a
more favorable political climate, but rather “tax” those responsible, perceived to be the
international community that uses waters nearby Somalia for commercial traffic.
The international community has largely used military force to combat maritime piracy,
despite the irrefutable proof that maritime piracy is a criminal act rather than one which
constitutes a form of warfare. Perhaps militaries are used to combat these acts because of their
36
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expanded capabilities relative to those of law enforcement counterparts (picture a law
enforcement agency with a blue water navy – an image nearly impossible to conjure). Some may
believe there is little reason why military force can or should be engaged in the fight to prevent
or deter maritime piracy, for it is instead a domestic law enforcement or economic issue. This of
course assumes that the nexus between piracy and terrorism remains disconnected and unproven.
On the contrary, others may hold that piracy is indeed warfare, favoring the perspective of
Cicero.
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CHAPTER THREE: STUDY METHODOLOGY
There are four aspects to this research’s methodology: design, sampling, data collection,
and data analysis. All four must be appropriate to answer the question “Are maritime pirates
linked to foreign terrorist organizations?” to achieve accurate findings. Each of the four aspects
will be identified individually in this chapter. According to Cyrus Mody, a manager of the
International Maritime Bureau, this methodology has not been used before by the nongovernmental organization in the study of maritime piracy. To Mody, the IMB looks closely at
individual incidents rather than examining trends which may name and shame ship owners and
countries of registry.39 The relationship between frequency of pirate attacks and ship registry has
not been a particular focus of the IMB since it could point a metaphorical finger towards certain
countries or corporations. Consequently, the methodology of this study is somewhat unique.
Design
To answer the research question, statistics from reported piracy and armed robbery
attacks are needed. If pirates are targeting certain and specific flags of registry, particularly those
of perceived enemies of Islamist insurgencies, it could serve as proof that pirates’ ends have
changed from seeking profit to seeking political change by punishing enemies of designated
foreign terrorist organizations. Consequently, the definition of “maritime pirate” can be
reassessed to see if their actions still fit the definitions of piracy provided by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the IMB. The IMO is the United Nations’ agency that
specializes in the security of worldwide shipping. The author will use quantitative data to assess
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ships’ registries attacked worldwide from 2005 through 2011 to see if any relationships or trends
emerge.
The author will explore economic factors that may contribute to the flourishing maritime
piracy acts off the coasts of Indonesia from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2011. It will be
determined that Indonesia’s gross domestic product per capita/purchasing power parity, or PPP,
likely has a negative relationship with its maritime piracy proliferation. According to the World
Bank, PPP “is gross domestic product (GDP) divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products.”40
Indonesia was intentionally selected as a case for the purposes of this study. Indonesia is
a state whose PPP and other economic data are readily available for research and interpretation,
unlike other piracy hotspots such as Somalia. Somali economic data are difficult to find because
of its current status as a failed state.41 Furthermore, the prevalence of piracy in Indonesia has
been steadily declining in recent years. The IMB in its 2009 Annual Report said that, “Indonesia
again is applauded for their tireless efforts in curbing piracy and armed robbery in its waters.
There continues to be a year on year decline in the number of incidents…”42 It may be of interest
to gauge how significant Indonesian economic conditions were in the decrease of pirate attacks.
Due to the ongoing successes in Indonesia, lessons learned in that particular geographic area may
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be applied to Somalia or other parts of the world to eliminate or reduce maritime piracy. This
success in the Indonesian region will be proven by quantitative data provided in chapter four.
The quantitative data will be supplemented by qualitative data produced by authors,
scholars, and experts in the field of modern maritime piracy. The qualitative information will be
able to supplement the statistics by explaining the opinions, feelings, and logic of the
perpetrators when selecting their targets. Numerous interviews have been conducted with alleged
and convicted maritime pirates around the world – all of which will assist with better
understanding and provide broader context for the quantitative data.
Data Sources
The population of study will be total worldwide maritime pirate and armed robbery
attacks between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2011 that were reported to the International
Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre. The years 2005 and 2011 were intentionally selected
for the purposes of this study. Maritime piracy information was not available to the author before
the year 2005. The year 2011 was selected to allow for the most updated information possible to
be used in this study. Maritime piracy figures for the year 2012 will not be released by the
International Maritime Bureau until early 2013, after the findings of this study will be published.
The sources of quantitative data will be the “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Annual Report 1 January - 31 December 2009” and “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Annual Report 1 January - 31 December 2011,” both published by the ICC International
Maritime Bureau. Although the titles imply that the documents only provide reported piracy &
armed robbery statistics for the 2009 and 2011 calendar years, data is provided in these reports
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between 2005 and 2011 to help illustrate emerging trends. Sampling for the study will not be
needed, because it is practical for the entire population to be identified and selected.
Data Collection
Reported piracy and armed robbery incidents, both actual and attempted, were reflected
in this data provided that it fit the IMB definitional criteria of, “The act of boarding or attempting
to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the
apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”43 Petty theft, for
example, would not be included in statistics by the IMB unless the perpetrator was known to
have carried a weapon.44
One of the weaknesses of the data provided by the IMB is that it is reliant on information
that was voluntarily reported. Many experts believe that ship operators and crews do not report
pirate activity to avoid paperwork and legal or insurance entanglements. It is believed that
pirating incidents are underreported, and that the reported figures should actually be increased up
to thirty percent to more accurately reflect reality.45 This voluntary reporting bias is important to
consider when interpreting the data. However, it is equally as important to remember that it is
impossible to overcome this bias unless all ship crews and/or operators are forced to report such
incidents, which is unlikely to occur in the future. There are no known systematic differences
regarding the voluntary reporting bias across varying geographic regions.
The strength of the data provided by the IMB is that it provides the most comprehensive
and authoritative assessment of reported piracy and armed robbery attacks available.
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Consequently, researchers and scholars alike repeatedly rely on information collected by the
IMB for a visual of where, who, and when the pirates strike.
The qualitative data, used to support the findings by analyzing the quantitative data, will
be obtained by researchers and scholars through various articles and books, some of which were
described in chapter two. Qualitative data will be primarily used from experts that gain
knowledge of the subject through immersion in Somalia and Indonesia, living and
communicating personally with maritime pirates.
Data Analysis
The study will assume that enemies of foreign terrorist organizations are the United
States of America and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The
reasoning for this assertion is that NATO has shown support for American military
counterterrorism and responses in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2012. Furthermore, there is no
formal index of “friendliness toward the United States.” Considering this absence, one could
argue that the amount of military/financial aid given by the United States to another state would
determine the governments’ allied status. The author’s counter to this argument is that many
states, such as Monaco, Luxembourg, and Andorra are allied but receive no military/financial
aid. To circumvent such debates, the author chose to use NATO states to identify formal allies to
the United States of America.
Ships attacked worldwide by pirates and armed robbers will be sorted by flag and be
subject to study if flagged by a member of NATO. If there is a high percentage of NATOflagged ships being attacked relative to other flagged ships, it could be further evidence that the
role of piracy has changed from earning a profit to punishing the United States and its allies.
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To test the IMB belief that pirates attack based on opportunity,46 it is compelling to
analyze a similar test but based on vessels that are flagged by states designated as a Flag of
Convenience (FoC) rather than allied countries. Analyzing the proneness of FoC vessels to
attack, in theory, will yield population increase because of the larger FoC population of vessels
traversing pirate prone waters. Due to the appeal of FoCs, vessel population will be larger than
the NATO population of vessels.
According to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITWF), a FoC ship is one
that flies a flag other than the country of ownership. A shipping company may want to fly a flag
and register the vessel in another country other than the one of ownership due to low registration
costs and more freedoms from labor regulations onboard. Major shipping companies and cruise
lines such as Royal Caribbean International,47 Carnival Corporation,48 and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines49
will register their vessels with FoC states to avoid such government intrusion. The ITWF website
“What Are Flags of Convenience?” (2012) advised:
Globalisation has helped to fuel this rush to the bottom. In an increasingly fierce
competitive shipping market, each new FOC is forced to promote itself by offering the
lowest possible fees and the minimum of regulation. In the same way, ship owners are
forced to look for the cheapest and least regulated ways of running their vessels in order
to compete, and FOCs provide the solution.50

The ITWF’s Fair Practice’s Committee has identified thirty four states known as FoCs. This list,
provided on the ITWF website “FOC Countries,” will be used to determine how susceptible
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vessels flagged by FoC states were to maritime piracy and armed robbery between 2005 and
2011.
An example to illustrate the ITWF’s concern is found on a website run by Jim Walker,
who practices maritime personal injury law in Miami, Florida. On October 20, 2011, Walker
posted online that Cunard Cruise Lines’ vessels would be registered in Bermuda, a move
breaking tradition that Cunard ships flew the Union Jack since 1840. Cunard’s official reason for
this decision was to perform weddings at sea, which are currently not allowed under British law.
Walker claims that it is likely that Cunard had other motivations for changing the registries of the
Queen Mary 2 and her sister ships; Britain’s “Equality Act of 2010” mandated that crew
members of European Union nationality had to be paid equal wages as British counterparts on
British flagged vessels.51 Cunard circumvents this legislation by dropping its ships’ traditional
British registries in favor of a FoC state. Regardless whether or not Walker’s claim is the true
reason for Cunard’s switch is irrelevant; the cruise line’s publicly stated desire to host weddings
at sea serves as a prime example of why ship owners and operators seek to register their vessels
in Flag of Convenience states.
Maritime Piracy Defined
To properly study the relationship between maritime piracy and terrorism, the definitions
of both concepts must be identified and be consistent throughout the study. Perhaps the earliest
definition of piracy comes from historian Plutarch writing about the year 100. Plutarch defined
pirates as “those who attacked on sea and coastal land without legal authority.”52 Haywood and
Spivak point out that the main importance to this definition is the relation between pirates and
51
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the state, not pirates and their actions.53 Consequently, the act of piracy had the potential to be
seen as socially acceptable if endorsed by or allied with a state, thus providing legal authority to
execute its actions.
In the modern context, there appears to be several definitions of maritime piracy that are
circulating amongst the maritime and legal communities. The one constant about defining piracy,
according to the United Kingdom’s House of Transport Committee, is that there is no single
definition. However, this committee defines piracy as an act of theft which can only occur on the
high seas outside of a state’s territorial waters.54 The International Law Association in 1970
defined piracy more broadly as, “unlawful seizure or taking control of a vessel by violence,
threats thereof, surprise, fraud, or other means” without any recognition or differentiation of the
territory in which it was committed.55
Perhaps the most binding legal definition of piracy is offered by the United Nations Law
of the Sea Convention and is used by the IMO. This definition includes, “Any illegal acts of
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
passengers of a private ship...against a ship…in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State”.56
Special emphasis needs to be placed on the words private ends, which serves as the key to
differentiating a pirate attack from a terrorist attack, which is likely executed for political ends.
Like the definition offered by the government of the United Kingdom, the IMO asserts
that the differentiation between a pirate and an “armed robber” is simply location and
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jurisdictional authority where the attack takes place. Those who could be classified as pirates in
international waters can sail a boat into a state’s territorial waters to then be redefined as armed
robbers. The change in definition and classification is due to a single arbitrary jurisdictional line,
despite identical intentions and motivations.
The IMO definitional loophole has been discovered and taken advantage of by pirates, as
they will deliberately strike within or near a territorial maritime border and then escape. In his
book “Non-Military Security and Global Order,” Peter Chalk described a case in May 1992
when: “The Royal Malaysian Police Marines were pursuing a stolen trawler that had been
preying on other vessels.” Chalk continues, “However, the Malaysians were forced to call off the
chase when the suspect vessel entered Philippine waters.” It is incredibly difficult for a
government to act unilaterally in such types of situations without risking international tension
and escalation.57 Only a specific legal agreement between two neighboring sovereign nations can
allow for hot pursuit into a nation’s territorial waters.
For the purposes of this particular study, the definition provided by the International
Maritime Bureau will be used. The IMB is an intergovernmental organization that compiles and
reports incidents of piracy. All quantitative data for this study is provided by the IMB, for it
provides the most thorough public statistical analyses on maritime piracy. For consistency and
ease of understanding, the definition of piracy used in this work must be identical to the
definition used by the IMB for their data collection. The IMB defines piracy as, “The act of
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boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other
crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”58
It is important to note that the term “piracy” as defined by the IMB encompasses acts of
piracy regardless of whether the ship is docked, anchored, or underway. Furthermore, this
definition does not recognize geographical territory or jurisdiction. A vessel under attack whilst
traversing the narrow Straits of Malacca, for example, may constitute an act of piracy under the
IMB definition of piracy, but not necessarily under the IMO definition. Perhaps some
participatory states in the United Nations’ IMO felt that adding the clause “…in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any State” was necessary to protect individual state sovereignty.
Terrorism Defined
A universally accepted definition of “terrorism” is impossible to define, as its concept is
complex. Terrorism is a violent act with definitions of varying participants, objectives, and
victims. Dr. James D. Kiras is a Senior Fellow of the Strategic Studies Division at the Joint
Special Operations University.59 According to Kiras, terrorists have the goal of achieving a
political result from their use of force.60 However, political results are achieved not directly by
terrorists’ actions, but rather, by provoking a desired response. For terrorism, as well as other
types of irregular warfare, asserted Kiras, victories, timelines, and intended targets are blurred
and undistinguished. Kiras advised:
…terrorism is defined as the sustained use of violence against symbolic or
civilian
targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread
attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable
response.61
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The violence’s political nature is what separates terrorism from other acts such as burglary,
murder, and piracy, which are usually waged for private ends. An example of terrorism on the
high seas is the 1985 hijacking of the ill-fated liner Achille Lauro, in which a small group of
armed gunmen seized the ship to demand the release of Palestinians from Israeli prisons. The
goal of the participants was politically related, not to gain personal profits through ransom.
The legally binding definition of terrorism is seen in Title 22 Chapter 38 § 2656f of the
U.S. Code as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine targets.” This definition of terrorism provided by the
United States government is more concise yet remains consistent with Kiras’. For the purposes
of this particular study, the definition of “terrorism” provided by the U.S. Code will be used.
It is important to consider, however, that the definition of terrorism as seen in the U.S.
Code may not be comprehensive. Consider the September 11, 2011 attack on the U.S. Pentagon
– were the actions of the al-Qaeda operatives considered those of terrorists? The act of hijacking
a civilian passenger aircraft (a noncombatant target) by al-Qaeda (a subnational group) fits the
definition of the U.S. Code as described. Because the primary target was the Pentagon, however,
it could be debated if this act was considered a terrorist act since the Pentagon is a military
facility. Others may hold that occupiers of the Pentagon facility are noncombatant, classifying
the attack of the building as a terrorist attack.
The hijacked civilian aircraft used to attack the Pentagon could be considered a secondary target.
The Pentagon attack in 2001 may or may not illustrate a shortcoming of the terrorist definition in
the U.S. Code, for there is no current distinction between intended primary and secondary targets
of terrorists.
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY FINDINGS
The research question of this study is, “Are maritime pirates ideologically and financially
linked to foreign terrorist organizations?” With the use of quantitative and qualitative data, it will
be proven that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the claim that maritime pirates and
foreign terrorist organizations form a nexus. By analyzing pirates’ opportunistic nature and the
relationship between economic performance and piracy, and by examining the business model of
piracy, policy makers can better understand motives behind piracy and form more effective
solutions to this thorny problem.
To first illustrate the magnitude of the maritime piracy problem, the author submits
Figure 1 which plots the locations of all attempted and successful pirate attacks reported to the
IMB in 2011. Red indicators on Figure 1 represent locations of actual pirate attacks against
vessels reported to the IMB, whereas the yellow indicators represent locations of attempted
pirate attacks. The few purple indicators mark locations of suspicious vessels reported to them
IMB. The locations of these indicators are heavily concentrated around the Horn of Africa and
Southeast Asia. Not only do these two regions host weak states, but their geography bears
narrow waterways which condenses heavily travelled sea lanes. These narrow waterways, such
as the Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden, are vital shortcuts that save shipping companies
time and money to deliver goods to destinations across the globe.
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Source: Braesch 2011

Figure 1 Reported Locations of Pirate Attacks Near Africa and Asia In 2011
NATO-Flagged Victims of Piracy
According to Jay Bahadur, one of the early speculations regarding pirate ransom dollars
being tied to foreign terrorist organizations came from Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor.62
Pirates are being used to smuggle weapons and supplies, alleged Jane’s, in return for bases to
stage their operations. It is also asserted in the article that pirates are being used by Islamists to
train their own naval forces to protect weapons smuggling operations.63
The cooperation between foreign terrorist organizations and maritime pirates creates a
nightmarish and not-so-farfetched scenario of vast funds being acquired by al-Qaeda, al62
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Shabbab, and others to finance their activities. If indeed there was such cooperation, it is likely
that maritime pirates would have a motivation closer aligned to that of foreign terrorist
organizations, with the goal of creating political change. The specific political changes are
irrelevant, but can be assumed to be counter to the interests of the United States and its allies,
which have been combating Islamic extremists across the world since 2001, particularly in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
If maritime pirates were to cooperate with foreign terrorist organizations, whose agendas
are perceived to be dangerous to United States’ nationals and interests, are the country’s and its
allies’ flagged ships more prone to piracy attacks? Logic would suggest that pirates, who like
anyone else around the world with internet access, have the ability to track vessels by global
location and ascertain ship type and flag. Websites such as http://www.vesseltracker.com and
http://www.marinetraffic.com can provide near real time vessel status, heading, and speed based
on the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS). This land-based system provides
navigation, tracking, and search-and-rescue aids to vessels. An unintended consequence is that
the AIS renders the possibility for pirates to attack discriminately and target western nations with
relative ease.
To test this theory, one must define the likely opponents of foreign terrorist
organizations. Likely contenders would be the members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) due to their participation in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.
Among the 28 member states of NATO are Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Poland, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
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The IMB provides annual analyses of worldwide piracy and armed robbery incidents
reported to the PRC. In the IMB’s annual reports, nationalities of ships attacked are compiled
and reported. Table 1 lists NATO member-states along the first column, and the reported
frequency of piracy and armed robbery incidents for vessels of the particular nationality along
each row. This table only reflects NATO members that had vessels attacked by pirates and armed
robbers during this period.
Table 1 Frequency of Vessels Attacked with NATO Member Registries, 2005-2011
Flag State
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium
1
Bulgaria
1
Canada
1
Croatia
1
1
1
Denmark
1
1
3
3
3
4
France
1
7
2
4
Germany
1
1
5
5
5
Greece
1
1
1
2
9
3
Italy
3
1
3
10
8
Lithuania
2
1
1
Luxembourg
1
2
Netherlands
3
3
4
3
9
3
Norway
3
3
8
7
5
5
Portugal
2
1
Spain
2
4
Turkey
1
2
2
2
8
3
United Kingdom
4
3
3
6
5
6
United States
7
6
1
5
4
4
Total NATO
23
21
31
45
65
53
Total
276 239
263
293
406
445
Worldwide
Percentage
8.33 8.79 11.79 15.36 16.01 11.91
NATO

2011
2

2
6
6
5
68

2005-2011 Total
3
1
1
3
22
20
22
29
33
4
4
25
39
3
8
24
33
32
306

439

2361

15.49

12.96

7
6
5
12
8
1
8

Sources: ICC International Maritime Bureau 2010, ICC International Maritime Bureau 2012

To summarize the results of the aforementioned data, only eighteen of the twenty eight
member states of NATO had registered ships that were reported to have been attacked by pirates
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and armed robbers between 2005 and 2011. The six year percentage that an attacked vessel was
flagged by a NATO member state was 12.96. The low number of reported attacks against vessels
flagged by NATO members suggests that pirates did not discriminately choose their targets
based on ships’ likely allied status with the United States of America.
It is interesting to note, however, that the percentage of NATO flagged vessels being
attacked in 2005 has nearly doubled by 2011. Cyrus Mody is a manager of the IMB who was
contacted by the author by e-mail to discuss this dramatic increase of NATO flagged vessels
attacked. There are two possible explanations for this increase that Mody suggested. 64 One such
cause, although unlikely, is that more vessels had registered under the flags listed in Table 1.
Consequently, the more vessels that are registered to a state, the more likely it is that pirates will
attack them. After all, a state with no vessel registrations has a zero percent chance of having a
ship attacked by maritime pirates.
Mody suggested that another explanation of the increase in percentage of NATO flagged
vessels attacked is that vessels are traversing risky waters in this time period. By traversing
waters prone to piracy more frequently, the opportunity for pirates to strike vessels will increase
as well. However, no data can be found by the author to determine if ship traffic has increased in
volatile areas in recent years.
Despite these two possible explanations, Mody was clear to point out that the IMB still
believes that pirate attacks anywhere in the world are based on opportunity regardless of the flag
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in which a vessel flies.65 Perhaps this is why he did not suggest a third possible explanation:
pirates are engaged in more selective targeting of their vessels, and are focusing more of their
efforts on ships registered to allies of the United States.
The Israeli Case
One of the strongest allies that the United States has is the state of Israel. Because Israel
is not currently a member of NATO, it could not have been listed as a country in Table 1 if any
of its registered ships were attacked by pirates between 2005 and 2011. The camaraderie
between the United States and Israel, particularly regarding their joint efforts to combat jihad in
the Middle East, compels one to ponder if Israeli ships have been targeted for piracy.
Between 2005 and 2011, no pirate or armed robbery attacks were reported to the IMB
against Israeli flagged vessels.66 Armed with this fact, one can draw two possible explanations of
why Israeli ships have been relatively unscathed during this time period.
First, Israeli ships may have been attacked by pirates and armed robbers, but have simply
not reported them to the IMB. This possible explanation seems highly unlikely. Even likely
enemies of Israel have reported piracy attacks against vessels registered to them, such as Iran,
Jordan, and Egypt.
The second, and perhaps more likely, explanation of why Israeli ships have not been
attacked by pirates during this time is because of the low exposure its ships have to pirate
infested waters. In 2010, there were only 15 Israeli-flagged vessels that transited the Suez
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Canal.67 It is unlikely, although unproven currently, that this figure would have changed
significantly between 2005 and 2011. The low number of Israeli flagged vessels transiting the
Suez Canal leads to the assumption of few ships transiting the pirate infested waters south of the
canal in the Gulf of Aden.
Non-NATO Industrialized Democracies
Consequently, the question of Israel compelled the author to create a control consisting of
non-NATO industrialized democracies. The author submits Table 2 that lists non-NATO
industrialized democracies that have registered vessels that reported piracy attacks to the IMB.
Table 2 Frequency of Vessels Attacked with non-NATO Industrialized Democracy
Registries, 2005-2011
Flag State
Australia
Austria
Japan
South Korea
Switzerland
Total nonNATO
Industrialized
Democracies
Total
Worldwide
Percentage
non-NATO
Industrialized
Democracies

2005 2006
1
2
2
4
2

2007

2008

1

2
3

2009

2010

1
1

4

2011
1
1
1
1

4

4

2005-2011 Total
2
3
6
13
3

2

9

1

5

2

27

276

239

263

293

406

445

439

2361

0.01

0.04

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

.01

Sources: ICC International Maritime Bureau 2010, ICC International Maritime Bureau 2012

While on the surface it may appear that vessels flagged by non-NATO industrialized
democracies have a lower probability of being attacked than NATO-flagged counterparts,
individual state 2005-2011 totals in Table 2 are similar to the individual state 2005-2011 totals in
67
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Table 1. The extremely low percentage of attacks on vessels of these states is because so few
states are categorized as non-NATO industrialized democracies in Table 2. Furthermore, many
states such as Sweden and Finland experienced none of their flagged vessels attacked by pirates
between 2005 and 2011, removing them from Table 2. Cases of attack in Table 2 are too few to
create a significant foil with Table 1.
FoC-Flagged Victims of Piracy
If a mere average of 12.96% of all reported piracy and armed robbery attacks took place
against NATO-member flagged ships between 2005 and 2011, against whom are the bulk of
these attacks? Research suggests that more than half of the victims are flagged by nations known
as Flags of Convenience, or FoCs.
Chapter three identifies at greater length the FoC concept. In short, states known as Flags
of Convenience have more lax rules and regulations than other states. Corporations are more
likely to register their fleet with FoCs to minimize taxes and government regulations, which
helps explain why it is likely that the population of vessels flying FoC flags would be far greater
than the population of vessels using flags of NATO members. If there is more opportunity for
pirates to attack vessels (i.e. more ships in a population sailing the world’s oceans), does that
mean that there are more reported incidents of pirate attack associated with that particular flag?
Table 3 lists countries that are FoCs along the first column, and the reported frequency of
piracy and armed robbery incidents for vessels of the particular nationality along rows. Not all
states that have been listed by the ITWF as FoCs have vessels that were reportedly attacked by
the IMB.
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Table 3 Frequency of Vessels Attacked with FoC Registries, 2005-2011
Flag State
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2005-2011
Antigua and Barbuda
8
10
13
14
24
24
16
109
Bahamas
9
5
7
12
18
10
11
72
Barbados
2
1
2
5
Belize
1
2
1
2
6
Bermuda
2
1
3
Cambodia
1
1
2
Cayman Islands
3
1
1
1
1
1
8
Comoros
3
1
2
6
Cyprus
13
5
10
14
13
9
8
72
Georgia
2
2
Gibraltar
1
6
2
2
3
2
16
Honduras
1
1
1
3
Jamaica
1
1
Liberia
18
24
28
19
38
57
57
241
Malta
11
14
6
10
21
19
25
106
Marshall Islands
9
7
16
15
29
36
45
157
Moldova
1
1
Mongolia
1
1
3
5
Netherlands Antilles
1
1
North Korea
1
1
5
2
9
Panama
50
42
42
52
69
82
71
408
St. Vincent & Grenadines
7
6
4
8
7
5
4
41
Sri Lanka
2
1
3
Vanuatu
1
2
1
2
1
1
8
Total FoC
138
117
141
155
229
255
250
1285
Total Worldwide
276
239
263
293
406
445
439
2361
Percentage FoC
50 48.95 53.61 52.90 56.40 57.30 56.95
54.45
Sources: ICC International Maritime Bureau 2010, ICC International Maritime Bureau 2012

It is important to note that states listed in tables 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. Although
the NATO six year average for attacks between 2005-2009 is 12.96%, the FoC six year average
for the same time period is 52.81%. The results of tables 1 and 3 suggest that flags of vessels
belonging to NATO members, in opposition to Islamic extremist movements across the world,
are not as attacked as frequently as the flags of vessels deemed to be FoCs. This suggests that
pirates choose their targets not based on political opposition to NATO activities around the
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world, but rather based on opportunity. For example, the Bahamas are likely to have more
commercial ship registries than Spain because of its low associated costs, rendering it FoC status.
There is more opportunity to attack a FoC flagged vessel because there are simply more of them
sailing the world’s waters.
The Iranian Case
While it can be shown that American and allied ships are not being specifically targeted
by pirates, are American rivals/enemies immune from piracy? If it can be shown that State
Sponsors of Terrorism have ships that are attacked by maritime pirates, perhaps the argument
that pirates and terrorists are closely aligned will be voided. After all, one could wonder, why a
gang of pirates would attack a perceived/potential ally.
The U.S. State Department lists four state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and
Syria. These four countries are determined by the U.S. Secretary of State to have supported acts
of international terrorism.68 Of these four countries, according to the ICC International Maritime
Bureau, only Iran reported piracy attacks during this time period. In each respective year, Iranian
flagged vessels reported being attacked seven times in 2005, two times in 2006, once in 2008,69
and once in 2010.70 Iranian ships seem to be prone to maritime piracy attacks just as other
nations of the world are.
An incident involving the Iranian Navy in late May 2012 may provide more evidence
proving that maritime piracy and terrorism are not forming a conspiracy against the United States
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and its allies. The Maersk Texas is an American flagged cargo vessel 500 feet long and weighing
14,000 tons. The vessel was bound for the United States from the UAE before becoming
attacked by what was described as several pirate boats. An Iranian warship nearby responded,
and upon arrival the pirates quickly fled. The Maersk Texas was thankful for the Iranian
intervention, and proceeded to its destination.71
Pirates Attack on Opportunity – Not Based On Who Owns/Operates the Vessel
The concept of pirates attacking ships based on convenience rather than political
affiliation is supported by Jay Bahadur’s research in Somalia. Bahadur interviewed Boyah, a
man who claimed to have participated in more than twenty-five maritime hijackings. Boyah
claimed that he and his men did not discriminate selection on their prey, and attractive targets
were selected by opportunity – whichever ships were unfortunate enough to be in close
proximity.72
Commercial ships in particular were favorable for attack by Boyah, identifiable by cranes
on their upper decks, since they were slower and easier to capture compared to passenger vessels
of similar size. Data produced by the IMB would likely agree that large and slow commercial
vessels are more susceptible to attack than smaller, more nimble craft that are better able to
evade pursuit. Over seventy percent of all vessels reported to be attacked in 2009 were classified
as bulk carriers, containers, general cargo, and tankers.73
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Data Suggesting Pirate Economic Motive
Lang established in his 2011 report to the UN Security Council that economic deprivation
is a theory to explain why some pirates begin careers in this criminal enterprise. The Somali
economy has been especially hurt by illegal fishing and toxic waste dumped off the coast, and it
is possible that many turn to piracy as a last resort to achieve economic prosperity. However, he
was quick to note that this theory has not been proven to date.74
Despite the uncertainty of the connection between economic deprivation and
proliferation of piracy, Lang does recommend to the UN Security Council that one way to
prevent acts of piracy in Somalia is to give hope to the country’s younger generation, who often
believe that no prosperous future is in sight for them. National and international investment in
Somalia’s banks, infrastructure, and fisheries are among the suggestions by Jack Lang to
dissuade Somalis from engaging in acts of piracy.75
The Indonesian Economic State
The World Bank Group’s website discloses Indonesia’s recent economic data.
Indonesia’s annual PPP, as mentioned on the World Bank Group’s website in US Dollars from
2005 to 2011 is reflected in Table 3. To better comprehend this positive trend, Figure 1 may be
considered.
In 1997, Southeast Asia suffered an economic meltdown with the depreciation of Thai
currency. This economic catastrophe led private corporations and the international community to
reevaluate investment in the region, with Indonesia being the hardest hit, resulting in a 20
74
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percent unemployment rate and a 13 percent reduction in GDP in 1997. According to the US
State Department website “Background Note: Indonesia,” Indonesia has since recovered from
the crisis due to economic stimulation, infrastructure management and bank oversight.76
Table 4 Indonesian Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (PPP) and Attempted/Actual
Pirate Attacks off Indonesia
PPP

$1,257.70

PPP
Percentage
Change from
Year Prior
-

$1,585.70

26.08

50

-36.71

$1,859.30

17.25

43

-14.0

$2,171.70

16.80

28

-34.88

$2,272.70

4.65

15

-46.43

$2,951.70

29.88

40

62.5

$3,494.60

18.39
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.15

Year
(CURRENT US$)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Attempted/Actual
Pirate Attacks

Attempted/Actual Pirate
Attack Percentage Change
from Year Prior

79

-

Sources: ICC International Maritime Bureau 2010, ICC International Maritime Bureau 2012, World
dataBank
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Figure 2 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and Pirate Attacks off Indonesia, 2005-2011
Causation
This study has irrefutably determined that in Indonesia from 2005 through 2011, there
was a gradual increase in PPP, whilst the proliferation of maritime piracy decreased as a whole.
However, it may be a mistake to interpret the quantitative findings to suggest that the increase in
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Indonesian PPP was solely responsible for the dwindling accounts of attempted and actual pirate
attacks.
If Indonesia and the international community took no steps to thwart maritime piracy in
the region, perhaps the state’s PPP would need to be the only variable to consider in explaining
the declining acts of piracy. Because law enforcement and military agencies have conducted
operations in the area to thwart piracy, it is necessary to introduce their efforts as another
variable that may have significantly contributed to the decrease in the cases of maritime piracy in
Indonesia.
Many experts in the study of maritime piracy contend that while Indonesia’s economy
plays a role in the reduction of attempted attacks, the main reason is law enforcement effort. One
example is Dr. Robert Gauvin, a technical advisor at the U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. In an email to the author dated March 29, 2011, Gauvin theorizes:
I believe [international coordinated efforts] and the small water area that required
coverage assisted as a major factor to the reduction of piracy. It is not to say that
[economic growth] did not suede people's thought of doing legitimate business as
the ease at pirating vessels declined heavily in their success rates due to this joint
government success.77
In other words, Gauvin believes that while multinational cooperation has successfully thwarted
piracy attempts, an increasingly beneficial economic situation in Indonesia allows for better job
prospects for its citizens. One may venture to further theorize that Indonesians turned to piracy as
an act of desperation, and improving job prospects allowed them to cease their illegal activities.
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However, other experts assert a higher role that economy plays, directly affecting
Indonesia’s law enforcement capabilities. Cyrus Mody of the International Maritime Bureau
remarked in a telephone interview with the author on March 29, 2011, “As society in itself
becomes better or starts growing, you can better allocate funds to law enforcement and that could
be an element which has helped in reducing piracy.”78 To paraphrase Mody, a greater economic
environment in Indonesia results in more revenue for the state. This revenue may be directed
towards law enforcement and military manpower or hardware. Spending increases may lead to
more pirate captures or deterrence, thus decreasing the magnitude of piracy in Indonesian waters.
According to the data presented, Indonesia experienced a sixty two percent increase in
pirate attacks off its waters in 2010. This statistic represents the first increase in pirate attacks
since at least 2005. The exact cause of this increase in pirate attacks remains unknown to the
author; however, the Indonesian Gross Domestic Product per Capita (PPP) data from 2009 may
offer a clue. Indonesian PPP between 2005 and 2008 enjoyed a respectable annual average of
twenty percent growth. The Indonesian economy declined in 2009, creating only a 4.65 percent
increase of PPP. If one were to subscribe to the theory that maritime piracy was tied to economic
decline, it would likely not be a surprise that piracy increased dramatically in 2010, the year
following the Indonesian PPP reduction. While this explanation may not offer a comprehensive
reason why Indonesia experienced an increase in attacks, economy may be one factor to
consider.
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Law Enforcement Efforts
Indonesia has maintained significant inter-state efforts to combat piracy in the Malacca
Straits. Perhaps the best known and successful effort was undertaken by the Indonesian military
in a venture popularly referred to as Operation Gurita. This undertaking was conducted in 2005
as a blatant show of Indonesian military capability in local piracy hotspots in an effort to foster
deterrence. Not only was the deterrence objective achieved, but many pirates were subsequently
arrested by Indonesian authorities as a direct result of the operation.79
Indonesia has not been acting unilaterally to increase security efforts in the Malacca
Straits. India has proved to be a reliable partner for Indonesia, for example. The two states have
pledged ships and aircraft in coordinated efforts to deter piracy and other maritime criminal
acts.80 Furthermore, Indonesia has cooperated in numerous international security agreements
such as MALSINDO, the code name for joint Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Malacca Straits
Coordinated Patrols, an air surveillance program called “Eye in the Sky,”81 the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP), and others.82
Indonesian policing efforts have discouraged some of its citizens from engaging in
piracy. One researcher documented how one Indonesian, for example, abandoned his career as a
pirate after facing an increasing threat from police authorities. Since leaving the profession,
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according to Major Kwan Hon Chuong of the Singaporean Navy, this particular individual has
become a successful businessman.83
Evidence Refuting Law Enforcement Impact
The Indonesian coastline is particularly difficult for law enforcement agencies to patrol
due to its extensive coastline with seemingly limited resources. The archipelagic state consists of
over 17,500 islands with a total coastline of over 50,000 miles. To patrol this large geographic
area, one Indonesian official told a news agency that 302 warships, 170 aircraft and an overall
state budget allocation of 5.6 billion US dollars are needed. However, it is estimated by The
Economist that up to twenty patrol boats and two aircraft are devoted to combat piracy with an
annual military budget of 2.3 billion US dollars.84 Teo cites this deprivation of resources and
financial backing as a leading cause of low morale and confidence in the navy’s ability to thwart
the piracy dilemma.
It is also apparent that Indonesia lacks a coordinated and substantial effort to secure its
waters from piracy. A whopping nine Indonesian agencies claim jurisdiction in the pursuit or
prevention of piracy. There are also many local agencies that may share such responsibilities.
Not only is there fierce competition amongst these agencies, there is little communication on
intelligence or resource sharing despite the same collective goals. In short, there is little
coordinated effort and that leads to confusion and redundancy, both of which are easily
exploitable weaknesses by the pirates.85
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Rosenberg and Chung echo Teo’s assertion that Indonesia has been less than fully
capable in combating piracy. It seems that Jakarta is largely preoccupied by the continuing effort
to fully recover from a recent tsunami tragedy. Japanese efforts to increase military patrols and
joint missions were met with great reluctance from Indonesia, citing national sovereignty and
high financial cost as reasons to refuse Japanese interest in piracy deterrence.86
How Ransom Dollars Are Allocated
To understand the business model of maritime piracy is to also refute any claim that there
is a substantial linkage between maritime pirates and foreign terrorist organizations. According
to research performed by Jay Bahadur, ransom monies are allocated to provide for weapons and
profits for participants and investors, and not necessarily or substantially foreign terrorist
organizations, as designated by the United States’ Department of State. Pirates have one
powerful incentive to limit their relationship with said organizations, as rhetorically described by
Bahadur, “If I’m a pirate and I’m giving money to al-Shabbab, I’m pretty sure that some
American is going to find out and drop a bomb on my head. It’s simply a very, very bad business
decision.”87 If the aforementioned opinion holds true, ransom dollars are not given to foreign
terrorist organizations to ensure that the following pyramid structure flourishes without
entanglements by the U.S. military.
Based on the estimations by Bahadur through interviews with multiple self-labeled
pirates in a series of personal interviews in Somalia, the business model of maritime piracy is
essentially a pyramid scheme. However, personal accounts by pirates often do not add up or may
86
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be contradictory. In “The Pirates of Somalia,” Bahadur provides external audits providing his
best estimations based on imperfect information provided to him. One example that can be given
to illustrate this pyramid scheme is the May 2009 hijacking of the Victoria, bound for the port of
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with a cargo of rice.88 A $1.8 million ransom was negotiated between the
pirates and the shipping company, and was delivered by airdropping the money into the ocean in
close proximity to the vessel. This sum was divided amongst 35 men, by Bahadur’s estimation.
Figure 3 illustrates the pay levels estimated by Bahadur for the 2009 hijacking of the Victoria.

Cook's Assistant - $9,000
Holders x 20 - $12,000 each
Head Cook - $20,000
Attackers x 8 - $41,000 each

Lead Attacker - $150,000
Logistics Officer - $30,000
Interpreter - $60,000
Accountant - $60,000
Supplies - $540,000
Investor - $360,000

Sources: Bahadur 201289and Kraska 201090

Figure 3 Ransom Payout for 2009 Hijacking of Victoria
Near the bottom of the hierarchy are the “holders,”91 or those responsible for maintaining
and securing a captured ship once it had been taken to a secure location such as a harbor. 92 Each
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of these twenty holders in the case of the Victoria hijacking was paid an estimated $12,000.
Although this may seem a high sum, the holders were responsible for guarding the vessel during
negotiations for ransom, which in this particular case took seventy two days at the port of Eyl. If
each holder was on duty for two-thirds of this period, or 1,150 hours, the hourly wage would be
$10.43, according to Bahadur’s calculations.93 James Kraska, professor at the U.S. Naval War
College, would likely agree with this estimate of low-level pirate salary. Kraska estimated that a
working-level pirate would likely earn $10,000 for a successful ship hijacking, a sum that many
fellow Somalis would earn after a decade’s worth of legal and legitimate income.94 Also at the
bottom of the pyramid would be a head cook (paid estimated $20,000) and an assistant ($9,000).
Both of these positions in the gang that hijacked the Victoria also remained onboard while the
vessel was detained in Eyl. Cooks provide the meals for the holders and other pirates onboard,
and would have earned up to $11.57 per hour for the same seventy two day period.95
In the middle of the pyramid are the attackers, those responsible for the execution of a
vessel hijacking. Attackers use high speed skiffs, armed with automatic weapons or rocket
propelled grenades, to overtake a ship and its crew intact. In the case of the Victoria, there were a
total of nine attackers. Eight received $41,000 each, and one received $150,000. This attacker
paid substantially more than his comrades reflected an elevated status within the group, and he
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also acted as a media spokesman of sorts – to confirm the status of the ship and the ransom
amount.96
The higher tier of the piracy gang pyramid is the group of officers, consisting of the
supply/logistics officer (paid approximately $30,000) to coordinate purchases such as fuel and
weapons, accountant (estimated $60,000), interpreter (estimated $60,000) for communication
with the crew, and commander-in-chief/investor (estimated $900,000).97 The estimations of
payroll in the pyramid provided by Bahadur fully reflects $1.8 million, the ransom paid for the
release of the Victoria.
James Kraska of the U.S. Naval War College agrees with Bahadur’s assement that about
half of the ransom monies are distributed to the top of the gang pyramid, the
commander/investor. Kraska further details this portion, about $900,000 in the case of the
Victoria hijacking, as sixty percent being spent toward the actual cost of the operation (fuel,
weapons, skiffs, et cetera) and forty percent for the investor(s), who may be as far away as the
Persian Gulf.98 It is this forty percent of the investor share, approximately $360,000 of the $1.8
million Victoria ransom, that may or may not go toward financing foreign terrorist organizations.
The hawala system of underground money transfers renders the tracing of money exceptionally
difficult, if not impossible. Maritime piracy researchers Dr. Alec Coutroubis and Dr. George
Kiourktsoglou believe that these financiers likely consist of politicians, former security
personnel, kingpins, and money launderers.99 No mention of foreign terrorist organizations or
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their leaders is made regarding the Somali pirate business model in an assessment by Coutroubis
and Kiourktsoglou.
Ransom Dollars After Allocation
One may rhetorically wonder what pirates do with their share of the ransom after it has
been allocated. Do these tens of thousands of dollars distributed to each participant support
foreign terrorist organizations? Findings suggest that such dollars most likely do not financially
assist such groups. In fact, the dollars are mostly for the personal edification of those that
participated in the hijackings.
James Kraska asserts that maritime pirates are usually between the ages of 20 and 35 and
are always engaged in this activity for financial profit. One Somali reported to the BBC in 2008,
“They [pirates] wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new cars;
new guns.”100 Simply, Kraska’s view is that the perpetrators are not ideologically or religiously
driven to commit their acts, but rather, seek to live life in luxury in an area of the world with
substantial poverty. Jay Bahadur, in his interviews with maritime pirates in Somalia, determined
that once a ransom is distributed, the participants will likely go on a spending spree that often
begins immediately once the cash is received. Endless credit is awarded to them with a
significantly high interest rate, suggests by Bahadur to be fifty cents per dollar spent. A Land
Cruiser for example could cost them $17,000, or perhaps a $20,000 sold for $40,000 accounting
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for the interest. The gang accountant keeps records of purchases and assures creditors that they
will be paid.101
Perhaps the prime tangible item that pirates in Somalia spend money on is catha edulis,
better known as khat or qaad. Since the late nineteenth century, it has been a male cultural norm
for Somalis to chew the leaves of this plant within 48 hours of picking. These leaves, still green
and fresh from the plant, provide addicting and stimulating effects to the consumer.102 Although
there are short term increases in perceived euphoria, strength, and sex drive, the long term effects
from khat use include tooth decay, mental illness, and ironically, low libido.103 Consumption of
khat is almost always a social event, carried out in “mefrishes”, or meetings of up to a dozen
men. Business deals, interviews, politicking, entertainment, dispute resolution, and other forms
of active socialization are carried out during such communal khat chewing sessions.104 Khat
chewing sessions are usually several hours long, with a growing number of Somalis having two
or three “mefrishes” each day.105 An equally telling manner to describe the rampant khat use in
Somalia is to examine it from an industrial standpoint. In 2005, it was estimated that $70 million
worth of khat is imported into Somalia yearly.106 While some Somalis make a small fortunate in
khat importation and sale, others spend small fortunes to maintain the habit. According to studies
by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the annual Somali household expenditure for
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khat, assuming normal consumption of two or three bundles each day for three hundred days,
would cost between $900 and $1500, equal to the average annual household income.107
Somali pirates are as equally susceptible to this habit as any of their counterparts in the
country. Pirates are preferred consumers for khat merchants in their markets, called “suqs.” Said
one such merchant, Maryan, “The men [pirates] have more money. They buy larger amounts and
they don’t ask for loans. The pirates pay in cash, nothing less.”108 Due to their more substantial
purchasing power, coupled with their ability to buy without having to be chased down to repay
loans, Somali pirates are preferred clients in “suqs.” Pirates’ heightened status in such markets is
further evidence that whatever ransom monies are given by shipping companies, once divided up
amongst all participating members of a pirate gang, are devoured for self rather than towards the
financing of international terrorism.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion
Based upon the quantitative and qualitative data provided in this study, there is currently
no evidence to substantiate the claim that there is ideological or financial linkage between
maritime pirates and foreign terrorist organizations. The author concludes that economic
deprivation serves as a primary motivation for pirates rather than possible alliances with foreign
terrorist organizations.
This conclusion is based on quantitative data provided by the International Maritime
Bureau that measures the frequency of ships attacked by pirates and armed robbers by national
registration. It is assumed that if there was an ideological tie between maritime pirates and
foreign terrorist organizations, vessels flagged and registered by the United States and its allies
would be attacked more frequently than ships of states that are not so registered. Data instead
suggests that the frequency of a flag’s vessels being attacked is most likely based on the
frequency that its ships traverse troubled waters. This supports the conclusion that these
criminals attack vessels based on opportunity rather than intentionally targeting a vessel based on
its nationality.
The conclusion of the study is also based on qualitative data, largely provided by
immersion into piracy social circles. Interviews conducted with maritime pirates, both known
and suspected, further the belief that the aim of maritime pirates is personal profit and gain rather
than the desire to achieve a political outcome. Ransom money spent by shipping and insurance

57

companies for the release of captured ships and crews are largely spent by the perpetrators on
material goods rather than investments in foreign terrorist organizations.
However, it is necessary to caution that the lack of evidence to support the theory that
maritime pirates and foreign terrorist organizations have formed an alliance does not mean that
such an alliance does not or will not exist at all. Perhaps in the future there will be a “smoking
gun” that will provide irrefutable proof that an organization such as al-Shabbab and maritime
pirates will cooperate on a larger scale. It should be the responsibility of the United States
government and the defense community to continue due vigilance against the terrorism and
maritime piracy phenomena, never losing focus of preventing a future possible nexus between
them.
Areas for Further Research
This study was conducted assuming that the United States of America’s and its allies’
ships would be more susceptible to targeting by maritime pirates if the latter were ideologically
or financially tied to foreign terrorist organizations. The author has made good a faith effort to
provide as near complete research as possible. Increased budget, time, and access to classified
information may allow for a more complete and accurate analysis of the topics covered in this
research.
One shortcoming of this study that must be acknowledged is that the gross domestic
product per capita (purchasing power parity) of Indonesia used in the fifth chapter does not
account for inflation. It is believed that the average inflation rate from Indonesia between 1997
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and 2012 is 12.13 percent.109 This seemingly high amount may have been skewed due to the
September 1998 Indonesian inflation rate of 82.4 percent.110
Another shortcoming of this study is that economic data for Somalia, to be used as a foil
against Indonesia’s gross domestic product per capita, was impossible for the author to obtain. It
is likely that such information was not accessible due to the country’s continued economic plight
and civil unrest. If armed with Somali gross domestic product per capita, the term “maritime
pirates” may not necessarily be grouped together globally, but could be divided into separate
entities based on geography for comparison. This will help further investigate potential theories
regarding the relationship between a country’s economic status and its susceptibility to piracy.
Somalia would serve as no better case for such a study, for it is currently the epicenter of the
piracy epidemic.
Policy Recommendations
“For whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade
of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself,” penned Sir
Walter Raleigh in 1829.111 Perhaps these words apply more now in the modern context than ever
before. Armed bandits must be prevented from inhibiting global sea trade, or else disastrous
economic or political consequences will ensue. How can piracy be combatted? To properly
answer this question requires a comprehensive understanding of the state, and its role in
remedying this situation. If a state has registered ships that are repeatedly attacked by pirates, is
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it better for that state to support anti-piracy efforts with Indonesia and Somalia or go beyond
their authority?
Traditionally, states have had the responsibility to enforce laws onboard ships that fly
their flags. Furthermore, these states have had the responsibility to protect this shipping, since
the crew or owner/operator were nationals of that particular state. In the modern context, this is
no longer the case. Hypothetically, a chemical tanker in the globalized world in which we live
today is registered in state “A,” may be owned/operated by a corporation headquartered in state
“B” with a cargo bound for and sold to state “C.” This vessel may be manned by a crew whose
nationalities are states “D,” “E,” and “F,” but it is attacked in the waters of state “G.” Do states
A, B, C, D, E, and/or F have an obligation to protect its citizens and property from piracy? If so,
do they cooperate with state “G” to combat piracy, or go beyond state “G” because they are
extra-national.
There are positive aspects for states A through F to go beyond state G to combat piracy.
A rapid military response may yield the capture and trial of the perpetrators of a particular attack,
acting as a deterrent for colleagues to conduct similar actions. Another positive aspect is that the
state(s) with citizens and property affected can have its military muscles flexed in an effort to
affirm and project power. A realist in particular would likely argue that an international
organization such as the United Nations has the inability for swift and decisive action that would
capture and deter pirates from aggressive deeds.
However, there is considerable risk in such unilateral action, which may be perceived as a
violation of the sovereignty of state G. Thus, state G and its citizens will likely not approve such
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action, as it undermines the authority and capability of its government. Furthermore, a retaliatory
response may instigate a “snowball effect” that would effectively deteriorate the situation.
Consequently, an internationalist would argue that a multinational cooperative effort is needed to
combat piracy. Since state G lacks the capability of enforcing laws to prevent piracy, or likely
lacks the economic opportunity to provide sufficient legal means of making a living other than
piracy, institutions such as the United Nations are needed to uplift the government of state G and
its people.
Success of the internationalist argument is illustrated in the Indonesian case as described
in chapter four. An informal international institution, the alliance of Indonesia, Singapore, and
Malaysia, proved to be successful in reducing the amount of piracy incidents in the region. The
author concedes that this internationalist solution is lengthier, and costlier than a realist
retaliatory response. A military strike against pirates that circumvent the host state’s sovereignty
presents a mere short term solution to a long term problem, like placing a small Band-Aid over a
severe wound. Efforts to work with the troubled states’ piracy problems offers the best hope for
long-term and permanent solutions. Thus, the author submits the following policy
recommendations to interested parties that may help reduce the frequency of maritime piracy
attacks: development, monitoring, and cooperation.
Incubate Industrial Development in Somalia
It is difficult to ascertain a sole reason as to why the Indonesian experience with maritime
piracy has been on the decline in recent years. There are a variety of variables, such as law
enforcement operations and international agreements, that may have an effect on the dwindling
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number of piracy cases. However, there is an unmistakable inverse relationship between
Indonesian PPP and attempted and actual pirate attacks. A more robust Indonesian economy may
significantly boost Indonesian military financial allocation. The study of Indonesian economic
growth and its military expenditures is a subject that warrants further investigation. Based on
such investigation, it may be worthwhile to assist Somalia and its regional neighbors with
economic vitality that will hopefully further dissuade youth from aspiring to maritime piracy.
However, the political environment in and around Somalia makes it highly unlikely that this
would happen in the near future.112
To address the piracy situations in other states of the world, it is necessary to address the
root cause of piracy, which may be linked to economic poverty. To address this issue, it is
necessary to encourage economic development in the most piracy susceptible regions of the
world. This will provide an alternative for people to earn a living. To further add to the risk-toreward ratio, a stronger government to implement deterrence is also necessary.113 A stronger
government requires more resources to operate effectively, and the primary means to do so by a
self-sufficient state is internal tax revenue. An increase in economic productivity will lead to an
increase in tax revenue attained by the government, thus allowing for an increased law
enforcement capability but also viable alternatives for Somalis to make careers from hijacking
ships.
An increase in economic productivity cannot come without infrastructural support. The
land mass of Somalia is 250 million square miles, but it only has a limited and unmaintained
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system of paved roads that run along major coastal cities. Furthermore, there is no functioning
land based telephone system in Somalia as of 1995.114 Limited infrastructure, caused by decades
of civil unrest, inhibits the ability for substantial economic growth. Inversely, the international
community may be reluctant to invest in Somali infrastructure, just as the Italians in the 1950s,
due to uncertain success.
The author challenges concerned states and international institutions to incentivize the
private sector to invest in Somalia’s resources: an abundance of land, strategic geographical
proximity to major shipping lanes, and an untapped pool of labor. This can help increase the
legitimacy of the local government in Somalia and dissuade its populace from the appealing
nature of maritime piracy. Although a legitimate federal government such as the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) is critical to maintain state unity and foster relations with the
international community, Somalia would likely fare best with local, decentralized governments
that have minimal intrusion from the TFG. Not only would this measure convince Somalis that
an authoritarian regime would not come to power again, but it would also allow for more direct
interaction and accountability between those in power and those who democratically elected
them.115
Continue to Monitor Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Maritime Pirates for Alliances
This particular study was unable to prove that an ideological or financial nexus has been
formed between maritime pirates and foreign terrorist organizations. However, the inability of
the author to find such proof does not mean that there is absolute certainty that there is no
114
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relationship, or that there will always be no relationship between both groups. It is wise to err on
the side of caution and treat the situation that there may be or eventually may be ties forged
between both groups. If financial ties were to be established between maritime pirates and
foreign terrorist organizations, it may be a literal “green light” for American and allied militaries
to begin large scale pre-emptive strikes against pirates on land. Further, it may allow for
international laws to be passed prohibiting the transfer of funds to pirates in the hopes of
preventing such monies from eventually making their way into terrorist hands. The risk, of
course, may come at harsher treatment of hostages, and perhaps even loss of life if all ransoms
were cut off completely due to legal constraint.
Intelligence will be the only way to determine if an ideological or financial nexus is formed
between maritime pirates and foreign terrorist organizations. In the meantime, the author
believes it necessary that the existing international maritime presence that secures seaways
should be continued. The placement of warships to deter or respond to piracy does not provide a
long-term solution to the problem, for it does not address the underlying motives that drive
pirates to engage in their acts.
Foster International Cooperation of Law Enforcement
In the case of Indonesian maritime piracy, a regional effort was made to increase law
enforcement capabilities and patrols. The risk of being caught by authorities was heightened,
helping dissuade potential pirates from engaging in violent hijackings. Regional cooperation with
Kenya, Ethiopia, and local hegemons such as Egypt and India can assist the Somali government
with intelligence sharing and additional patrols to provide deterrence and a more rapid response
once a hijacking attempt has commenced. This of course assumes that Somalia’s government is
64

stabilized and a more substantial effort to combat piracy can be waged. Further, states in a
hypothetical cooperative including Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, and India may have enough incentive
to help their geographic neighbor. Many neighboring states, however, have limited resources;
their politicians may have difficulty in convincing their constituents that precious manpower and
equipment sent to Somalia is a wise investment.
One of the strategies utilized to eradicate maritime piracy on the ground has been the use of
private security firms to act as proxies. The United Arab Emirates has taken a leading role in
hiring mercenaries with likely tacit support from American clandestine organizations. This
initiative to hire thousands of African soldiers has had moderate success with little political price
to pay for the governments involved.116 It would not be too difficult for one to imagine the
political fallout resulting from an American politician if he/she supported direct military
intervention. Nevertheless, there is concern that the continued use of a non-transparent private
army may lead to unintended consequences in the future. Just as the Italians abandoned
colonization efforts in Somalia, the mercenaries may find themselves on their own once
financing runs out. The well trained and well equipped private forces may turn to the next
highest bidders, which may very well be maritime pirates or foreign terrorist organizations.
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